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I. INTRoDUcTIoN
The prohibition of anti-personnel landmines was a resultant of a transnational 
social movement coalition emphasizing human security more than national 
security. The social movement coalition behind the outlawing of anti-
personnel landmines has challenged the usefulness of mines as an instrument 
for military defense and exposed landmines as a direct threat to human 
security. The coalition relays graphic images of landmine damage and 
continually updates statistics about mine-affected communities in order to 
help people understand that anti-personnel landmines incur humanitarian 
disasters. The coalition’s efforts have led landmines to be perceived as a 
threat to human security (Banerjee and Mugah 2002: 43-46; Parlow 1994; 
Rutherford 2000: 70-110; Taylor 2008: 41-45; Wexler 2003: 576-578).
While carrying out a variety of campaigns to raise the awareness of 
anti-personnel landmines as a threat to human security, the anti-landmine 
coalition has collaborated politicians to place the prohibition of anti-
personnel landmines on the political agenda (Sigal 2006: 9-24). The coalition’s 
efforts ultimately resulted in the 1997 ottawa Treaty.1 Some like-minded 
countries which played key roles in making the ottawa Treaty coalesced 
into the Human Security Network in 1999, which comprises of ministers 
of foreign affairs from Austria, canada, chile, costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, 
Mali, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand. The Human 
Security Network has labeled landmines as a cause of “human devastation” 
and approaches the campaign to ban landmines as a way to improve human 
security and eventually to realize “freedom from fear.”
There were two legislative campaigns to import some components of 
the ottawa Treaty into the Republic of Korea in the 2000s: one for clearing 
landmines and providing compensations from landmine victims and the 
1 It is the conventional name given to the ‘convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction’. The ottawa Treaty’s first draft was presented in oslo, Norway on 
September 18, 1997 and it was open to signing in ottawa, canada on December 12, 
1997. It entered into force on March 1, 1999, right after 40 countries ratified the treaty.
 Pathways from International Society to National Legislature 257
other for providing humanitarian assistances for landmine victims.2 Although 
neither campaign succeeded, the anti-landmine norm has slowly diffused 
through the National Assembly’s public hearings and policy discussions. 
Furthermore, the anti-landmine norm has indirectly challenged the military 
advantage of the landmines even in the demilitarized zone (DMZ).3 The 
National Assembly has become a venue for the anti-landmine norm to be 
internalized in the Republic of Korea.
This article examines the two campaigns to internalize the anti-landmine 
norm in two step: one to raise the awareness of landmines as a threat to 
human security and the other to legislate the norm. More specifically, this 
article focuses on the Korea campaign to Ban Landmines (KcBL) which 
has introduced the anti-landmine norm to Korea and has been involved in 
the two legislations.4 Also, this article explores the two pathways where anti-
landmine norm has diffused into the legislative process in Korea. Lastly, it 
assesses the relative power of assemblyman’s constituency interest, socio-
political orientation, partisan affiliation, and committee participation in 
explain why legislators join the co-sponsorship of the two anti-landmine 
2 “The Bill on the clearance of Anti-Personnel Landmines and the compensation to 
Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-o” (draft bill # 162627, 09.05.2003): 
“The Special Bill on Assistances to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Park, chan 
Suk” (draft bill # 174946, 09.18.2006). Assemblyman KIM’s draft bill was not discussed 
at any legislative step of the Standing committee for National Defense, National 
Assembly and it was discarded because the 16th National Assembly ended its term on 
May 29, 2004. Assemblyman Park’s draft bill was reviewed by the Standing committee 
for National Defense. The Standing committee for National Defense decided not to 
pass it to the plenary of National Assembly, because the draft bill would be in conflict 
the compensation law. The Standing committee for National Defense recommended 
the Ministry of National Defense review alternative methods such as an international 
trust fund and medical treatment for those affected by mines. (Secretariat of National 
Assembly 2007, 14-17).
3 Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo publicly advocated the removal of mines in the DMZ 
between the two Koreas for “the conservation of the DMZ’s ecosystem and its peaceful 
development” (Kim, J. 2009).
4 The KcBL has been the forerunner in the diffusion of the anti-landmine norms 
since 1998 in Korea. It participated in the legislation of the norm by drafting the 
second anti-landmine bill with Assmelbyman Park, chan Suk from 2004 to 2007 and 
participated in congressional hearings (Jo 2008).
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bills.5
II.  THE TWo PATHWAYS IN THE DIFFUSIoN oF THE ANTI-
LANDMINE NoRM IN THE LEGISLATIVE PRocESS
In February 1998, Jody Williams, the founding coordinator of The 
International campaign to Ban Landmines, visited Korea. Her visit raised 
the awareness of landmine issues in Korea. She was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize in December 1997 for her contribution to the conclusion of the 
ottawa Treaty and was invited by the KcBL. While staying in Korea, she met 
the politicians and members of social movement organizations who were 
involved in or sympathetic to the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines.6 
National Assemblyman Kim, Sang-hyun, who was the leader of the 
Environmental Forum of the National Assembly and attended Jody Willams’ 
lecture, promised her that he would organize a congressional hearing 
on the issue. The first hearing, which was entitled as “The International 
Agreement to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines and our Response,” was held 
at the Environmental Forum of National Assembly (Environmental Forum 
of National Assembly 1998: 668). Since then, the anti-landmine norm has 
become an agendum at the National Assembly. This section first reviews the 
diffusion of the international norms in general and then discusses the two 
diffusion pathways through which anti-landmine norms have permeated into 
the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.
5 There is very limited empirical research on the co-sponsorship in the National 
Assembly. The presence of network among assemblymen in the co-sponsorship 
was reported (Shin, H. 2004; chung, W. and Kwon, H. 2009) and the size of co-
sponsorship was positively associated with the chance of success in the legislative 
process (Youm, Y. 2007).
6 The KcBL dispatched two people to the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize Award ceremony to 
discuss Jody Williams’ visit to Korea. The KcBL organized several events where Jody 
Williams handed over prosthetic legs to landmine victims. Also, the NGo arranged 
meetings with politicians and activists to raise the awareness of landmine issues and 
internalize the anti-landmine norm (interview with cho, J., the founding coordinator 
of the KcBL, 01.08.2007).
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1. The Diffusion of International Norms
There are three phases in the life cycle of international norms: emergence, 
cascade, and internalization (Finnmore and Sikkink 1998: 894-96). At the 
emergence phase, activists and organizations who have strong feeling on 
certain issues work to get others embrace their beliefs. Activists frame certain 
issues to be consistent with their beliefs, while challenging the conventional 
framework (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2-3). They eventually present a set of 
alternative normative frameworks on certain issue. At the cascade phase, 
norm entrepreneurs muster supports enough to get their norm widely 
accepted at a political community. At this stage, some activists abroad, who 
are not involved the norm emergence, import the norm into their political 
communities (Koh 2004: 337-39). At the internalization phase, the imported 
norm is widely accepted to be taken for granted. 
There are two schools on how international norms affect the behavior 
of state actors and non-state actors in two ways. The first school, liberalists, 
claim that international norms change conventional incentives and lead 
social forces and political activists to behave differently; thus, actors shift 
their behavior to make it consistent to the new payoff matrixes (Moravcsik 
1995; cortell and Davis 1996). According to liberalists, states get benefits by 
abiding by international norms and increase their national interests, while 
being restricted from doing what is not consistent with international norms. 
International norms appear to regulate the behavior of states, as states are 
responsive to new incentives which international norms bring. In contrast, 
constructivists claim that the effect of international norms is much deeper. 
constructivists focus on the process where state actors shape their identity 
based on international norms and frame their national interests consistent 
with those norms. They emphasize international norms as a reference to 
national identity and interests (Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996).
The two schools are similarly interested in the effect of norm diffusion 
upon the behavior of states. More specifically, the two schools are interested 
in how international norms would bring changes in the behavior of states, if 
states comply to international norms. The two schools share the assumption 
that states are rational actors and examine the effect of international 
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norms upon the behavior of states at the interstate or systemic level. The 
two schools do not pay attention to how international norms diffuse into 
domestic politics. In other words, the two schools are not interested in how 
international norms are domesticated into the legal system at the national 
level. The compliance of international norms is not identical to internalization 
(checkel 1997: 473-74). 
The genuine effect of international norms may be found in the process 
where norms diffuse into the domestic legal system or practices of individual 
states. It is state that eventually enforces international norms at the national 
level. The research on the diffusion of international norms is helpful in 
measuring whether and how international norms are internalized. The 
efficacy of international norms should be assessed in terms of whether 
states implement them at the national level. Therefore, domestic politics 
is a key factor in the diffusion of international norms (cortell and Davis 
2000: 66). Political activists who import international norms without much 
consideration of material incentives are conditioned by their domestic 
political contexts (Landolt 2004: 579-80). 
The diffusion or internalization of international norms starts with norm 
empowerment, a process where prescriptions embodied in international 
norms become agenda in domestic political contexts (Schweller and Priess 
1997: 3-11). Norm empowerment refers to legitimizing certain political 
behaviors which are consistent with norms. It, as a process of politicization, 
highlights early stages where international norms become prominent 
agenda in domestic politics. As it occurs through changes in discourse, 
norm empowerment is deeply involved in political debates and discourse 
competitions (checkel 1997: 475-76).
Norm empowerment refers to a politicization of norms, while norm 
compliance means simply adopting norms. The diffusion of norms includes 
various political decisions. once they are introduced into domestic political 
areas, international norms affect political actors’ behavior and their choice 
repeatedly. When they are routinely obeyed by actors, international norms 
become conventional at the national level and actors come to have a belief 
that certain norms should be followed. Norms provide legitimacy to certain 
behaviors at early phases and become later conventional references to how to 
behave in domestic political areas. 
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Hence, the national legislature plays important roles in internalizing 
international norms into domestic political areas. Though various actors are 
involved in the diffusion of international norms, such as the United States 
congress, officials in developing countries, lobbyists in Western democracies, 
members of global civil society, and national policy makers (checkel 1997: 
474), political elites play primary roles in the internalization of international 
norms, because the legislature decides whether to domesticate international 
norms at the national level (cortell and Davis 2000: 70-71). The incorporation 
of international norms into domestic legal system is a later stage in the norm 
diffusion.
There are two pathways where legislators interact with international 
norms. First, legislator may bring international norms for their constituency 
interests. Though they do not internalize international norms into their 
beliefs and behavior, legislator may introduce international norms into 
domestic political issues in the ruse of global opinion or standard. Legislators 
are interested in taking care of their constituency interests for their re-
election. Second, legislators who are exposed to international norms 
may redefine their interests. Transnational advocacy networks provide 
information consistent with international norms to legislators. Those who are 
sympathetic or attentive to international norms may assess their interests and 
political outcomes unconventionally. The cooperation between legislators and 
transnational advocacy networks  may lead to new political contexts.
2. Pathway 1: Constituency Politics
constituency interests are identified in the diffusion of the anti-landmine 
norm into the Korean National Assembly. Some assemblymen whose 
districts include minefields have brought anti-landmine norms to politicize 
the presence of landmines in their districts. Korea’s minefields are generally 
grouped into two categories. one category has been named as “unconfirmed 
minefield,” an area where the exact locations of the mines are unknown. 
These unconfirmed fields were formed in two ways. First, fighting forces 
in the Korean War failed to record the exact locations of the mines or they 
lost their records. As the warfront became volatile and chaotic, militants in 
both sides planted mines without having the time to create a detailed record 
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or map, hence the Korean War has left a number of undocumented and 
unconfirmed minefields in Korea. Second, there are areas where misplaced 
landmines are believed to be laid down. When some mines were displaced by 
floods, landslides, and avalanches, areas near to the location of mines have 
been designated as “unconfirmed minefields”.7 For example, floods in North 
Korea in the mid-1990s led to displace landmines from North Korea and the 
DMZ into South Korea and have increased the risk of mines. 
The other category is “confirmed minefield,” an area where mines 
have been precisely recorded. Three separate incidents are responsible 
for “confirmed minefields” in Korea. First, the Korean Military planted 
landmines in the DMZ and in the Military control Zone (McZ) contiguous 
to the DMZ to slow down the North Korea’s any possible attack. In addition, 
the Korean Military in the rear areas planted landmines to protect military 
facilities. Second, fearing of North Korea’s attack in collaboration with the 
former Soviet Union during the 1962 cuban Missile crisis,8 the US forces in 
Korea planted landmines around U.S. military bases.9 Third, around the mid- 
to late 1980s, when the Asian Games and olympics were hosted in South 
Korea, the Korean Military planted landmines around air defense units, 
which have been located near metropolises.10 The South Korean government 
in the 1980s was fearful of the possibility that North Korea might carry out 
preemptive strikes against air defense units first. The minefields around air 
7 In 2003, Korea’s Ministry of National Defense reported that there were 112.5 km2 
minefields (90.7 km2 unconfirmed minefields, 23.8 km2 confirmed minefields). In 
contrast, the KcBL estimated that the size of minefields in Korea would be at least 300 
km2.
8 During the cuban Missile crisis, the Kennedy administration concluded that the 
cuban missile was a trap. The Kennedy administration worried that the Soviet Union 
would attack Berlin, while attracting US attentions to cuba (Allison and Zelikow 
1999: 99-108). The trap hypothesis led US military forces in Korea to prepare North 
Korea’s attack.
9 The KcLB claims that the US military forces in Korea have been responsible for at 
least 26 civilian landmine casualties. 24 US military facilities have minefields for 
protection, though they have not been involved with any landmine accident (The 
KcBL 2003).
10 The KcBL claims that anti-personnel landmines were planted around 33 air defense 
facilities in the rear in the 1980s.
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defense units have given a serious threat to human security in South Korea, 
where air defense units are located near by large cities.
It is expected that any legislator whose district has minefields will take 
interest in eradicating mines and bringing relief to mine victims. Every elected 
legislator has a higher chance of re-election when s/he projects constituency 
interests into the legislative process. Electorates who face mine threats, such 
as those who live in the Military control Zone or nearby minefields, are likely 
to support candidates who promise to get rid of landmines and provide aids 
to landmine victims. Also, electorates whose lands have mines or are located 
nearby minefields would develop their land more freely, if landmines were 
gotten rid of. candidates from areas in and around minefields may bring 
the anti-landmine norm as a way to satisfy their district demands for their 
election.
So far there are two cases where assemblymen brought the anti-mine 
norm for their constituency interests. In 2000, Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-o, 
who represents Yeongdogu in Busan, initiated a legislative process to clear 
mines and provide relief to mine victims. Landmines were planted on 
Mt. Jungni, Yeongdogu to protect the US air defense base in the 1950s. A 
displaced mine claimed a fire fighter’s ankle, who put out a fire near the 
minefield on February 25, 1996 (KcBL 2003). The landmine incident led 
electorates in Yeongdogu to perceive the mine threats. 
cho, Jai-Kook, the founding coordinator of the KcLB and a co-worker 
with Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-o, described the link between constituency 
interests and anti-landmine norm as follows:
“Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-o represents Yeongdogu, Busan. Mt. Jungni is 
located in Yeongdogu and many landmines were planted in that area. The 
landmine clearance was a major constituency interest in his district. In all 
honesty, I think that Assemblyman Kim independently initiated the legislative 
process and then proceeded with a collaborative research effort regarding 
landmines. … Assemblyman Kim’s office made the first move in asking the 
help from the KcBL. After the KcBL responded favorable to his move, he 
proposed collaboration.”
“I personally wanted the KcBL to focus on providing aids to landmine 
victims. I believed that it would be too difficult to pass the anti-landmine bill 
which dealt with both humanitarian assistance and mine clearance. I also 
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believed that it would be difficult for the National Assembly to pass the bill to 
provide compensations for civilian landmine victims, as it was a retrospective 
measure. However, Assemblyman Kim and his office said that they could 
not leave out the mine clearance” (from an interview with cho, Jai-Kook, 
2009.9.18).
Assemblyman Kim’s bill was not passed, but the constituency interest of his 
district was satisfied. The Joint chief of Staff, the Korean Military decided 
to clear 36 mine-affected areas in the rear, and within them the clearance of 
landmines in Mt. Jungni area was the first project (Yu, H. 2001). The mines 
in the Mt. Jungni area were gotten rid of in 2003 (Park, H. 2003). After the 
mines in his district were cleared away, however, Assemblyman Kim became 
disinterested in the anti-landmine norm.11 
Second, Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo, who represents P’och’eon and 
Yeonch’eon, Kyeonggido, has been preparing another bill on mine clearance 
in collaboration with the KcBL. The Military control Zone includes some 
parts of P’och’eon and Yeonch’eon and has been mined since the armistice of 
the Korean War. Furthermore, displaced landmines which have been swept 
away from the North Korean side and the DMZ and ended up in the Hant’an 
River and Imjin River basin have posed a threat to electorates and visitors 
in P’och’eon and Yeonch’eon. Also, the presence of minefields adjacent to the 
DMZ has been a roadblock against development in his district. Therefore, the 
clearance of landmines is the primary constituency interest for Assemblyman 
Kim, YoungWoo.
cho, Jai-Kook described the cooperation with Assemblyman Kim, 
YoungWoo as follows:
“Nobody at the KcBL knew Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo, before he was 
elected. After he was elected, I gave him a call to ask for his help in aiding 
landmine victims. At the time, he showed no interest in the matter. However, 
I heard later that he was interested in clearing landmines in the DMZ and 
aiding landmine victims in his district. When I called him again, he told me 
that he was preparing a bill on landmine clearance. He said that he came to 
know the KcBL, while preparing his bill. He wanted a collaboration with us” 
11 In 2006, Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-O co-sponsored Assemblyman PARK’s bill.
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(from an interview with cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).
Both Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-o and Kim, YoungWoo were more 
interested in clearing landmines in their districts rather than banning anti-
personnel landmines and providing humanitarian assistances in general. 
The anti-landmine norm has more ideological affinity to progressives 
than conservatives. considering that the two Assemblymen are political 
conservatives, their enthusiasm toward the anti-landmine norm appears to 
reflect their constituency interest.12
3. Pathway 2: Progressive Transnational Advocacy Networks
considering that landmine issues are closely associated with human security, 
it is highly likely that progressive transnational advocacy networks work as 
an intermediary in the diffusion of anti-landmine norms. As transnational 
advocacy networks are interconnected based on their ideological orientations, 
those who have participated in progressive transnational advocacy networks 
and are elected into the National Assembly have an ideological affinity to the 
anti-landmine norm in general and are expected to bring the anti-landmine 
norm to the legislative process. A large number of young activists, who had 
been involved in various social movements, were recruited into the National 
Assembly since 1996. They were labeled as “young blood” and formed an 
influential group. Especially, the number of Assemblymen who had been 
involved in social movements was substantial in the 16th and 17th National 
Assemblies (2000 to 2004, 2004 to 2008) (Yoon, J. 2004; chang, B. 2004). The 
National Assembly came to be favorable to the anti-landmine norm.
The legislative process of the draft bill entitled as “the Special Bill on 
Assistances to Landmine Victims” in 2006 shows that the ideological affinity 
between assemblymen who were involved in progressive transnational advocacy 
networks and the anti-landmine norm is positively associated with the diffusion 
of the anti-landmine norm. After witnessing that Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-o 
12 Assemblyman Kim, Hyong-o described himself a right-wing conservative while 
Assemblyman Kim, YoungWoo declared himself a moderate conservative (Koh, J. and 
chung, K. 2008; Kim, B. 2009).
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failed to get his bill ever reviewed at any level in 2003, the moderate wing in the 
KcBL shifted their focus to providing aid for landmine victims.13 While it 
was looking for someone to present a bill to help landmine victims, the KcBL 
was connected to Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon. cho, Jai-Kook described 
the collaboration between the KcBL and Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon as 
follows:
“There is an ecumenical forum among religious leaders called as Korean 
conference of Peace for Peace (KcPP). The late pastor Kang, Weon Nyong 
is one of the founding members and also served as the president. I met the 
last pastor Kang in a KcPP meeting and asked his help to find assemblymen 
who would propose a bill to aid landmine victims. The last pastor Kang 
immediately introduced me to Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon, a leader in a 
peace movement based on Won-Buddhism in Korea to help war victims and 
orphans. Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon served as the secretary-general of 
the KcPP, when the late Pastor KANG served as the president of the KcPP. 
He was the majority leader of the National Defense committee, National 
Assembly, when I met him first” (from an interview with cho, Jai-Kook, 
2009.9.18).
“Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon approached the anti-landmine campaign 
as a peace movement. He was very interested in the KcBL’s anti-landmine 
initiative. He promised to sponsor a bill which the KcBL prepared to help 
landmine victims. He collaborated with us” (an interview with cho, Jai-Kook, 
13 Since its establishment, the KcBL was comprised of moderates who focused on 
humanitarian aid to mine victims and hardliners who shared anti-American and 
anti-governmental sentiments. Mr. cho described the relationship between the two 
factions in the KcBL as followings: 
    “There were ideological differences among the early members of the KcBL. … 
A portion of the participants approached the anti-personnel landmine issue as a 
continuation of anti-nuclear and anti-war movements where they were affiliated. 
These people, who were relatively more militant, slowly phased out of the KcBL. 
The linkage between the KcBL and organizations where former KcBL hardliners 
were affiliated also weakened. After hardliners left the KcBL, the remaining 
members focused on directly helping landmine victims and began collaborating 
with governmental officials and law-makers” (from an interview with cho, Jai-
Kook, the founding coordinator of the KcBL, 2009.9.18).
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2007.8.1).
Assemblyman Park, chan-Suk sponsored the bill that the KcBL and 
Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon prepared. There were two reasons that 
Assemblyman Park, chan-Suk played the leading role on the surface, though 
he was not involved in the early stage of preparing the second anti-landmine 
bill. First, Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon was elected as the chairman of 
the National Defense committee in the second half of the 17th National 
Assembly. He was reluctant to introducing the bill, since he was afraid that 
his initiative would pressure his committee colleagues. Instead, he asked 
Assemblyman Park, chan-Suk to sponsor the bill. Second, the KcBL had 
personal ties to a few staff in Assemblyman Park, chan-Suk’s office. Park, 
Hyeongyong, who was a staff for Assemblyman Park, chan-Suk and had been 
the student union leader at Kyungpook National University, has been friends 
with Ko, Jeongho, who was involved in the KcBL. cho, Jai-Kook described 
the relationship among the KcBL and the two assemblymen in detail as 
follows:
“The KcBL had five meetings with some officials from the Ministry of 
National Defense and the Ministry of Justice at Assemblyman Kim, Sung-
Gon’s office. Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon played the intermediary role 
between us and the government officials. We came to find a common ground 
and agreed to introduce a draft bill to help landmine victims. While preparing 
the bill, Assemblyman Kim, Sung-Gon was elected as the chairman of the 
National Defense committeee, National Assembly. Assemblyman Kim, Sung-
Gon said that he would make arrangements for Assemblyman Park, chan-Suk 
to sponsor the bill. Nobody at the KcBL had ever heard of Assemblyman Park, 
chan-Suk, but one of our members was a friend with an aide to Assemblyman 
Park. Expecting that the personal tie would lead to an efficient collaboration, 
we contacted Assemblyman Park and asked him to lead the legal process” 
(from an interview with cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).14
14 Mr. cho, Jai-Kook revealed a negative opinion on the collaboration with Assemblyman 
Park, chan-Suk as follows:
    “Assemblyman Park, chan Suk had no interest in landmine issues. He did 
not make any efforts to pass the bill. … He took care more of his constituency 
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III. co-SPoNSoRSHIP FoR THE ANTI-LANDMINE NoRM
co-sponsorship is a requirement for any draft bill that is introduced by 
assemblymen in the Korean National Assembly. The Article 79 of the National 
Assembly Law stipulates that any draft bill shall be sponsored by at least 10 
assemblymen. Any assemblyman must gather at least nine supporters, when 
preparing to propose a bill. The law has led to a flood of co-sponsorships.15 
This section reviews how the KcBL targeted assemblymen as potential 
co-sponsors. And then, it categorizes the factors to lead assemblymen to 
participate in co-sponsoring the two draft bills of the anti-landmine norm 
into constituency interests, ideological affinity, and partisan affiliation. 
1. Initiators’ Interests
The initiator of any draft bill tries to get co-sponsors whose participation 
highlights the public interest and political relevancy of the bill (Kessler and 
Krehbiel 1996: 555; Wilson and Young 1997: 29). There are two major factors 
in the co-sponsorship for the success of a draft bill. one is the size of co-
sponsorship, which signals the amount of support behind the legislation. 
Even if legislators are not familiar with a draft bill, the sheer number of the 
co-sponsors for the bill gives an impression that  the draft bill is consistent 
with public interest (Koger 2003: 228). Therefore, those who plan to sponsor 
any draft bill to the National Assembly attempt to increase the co-sponsorship 
size. The co-sponsorship size actually has a positive relationship with the 
probability of legislative success (Browne 1985: 483-88; Wilson and Young 
1997: 34-37). This is called as the bandwagon model (Kessler and Krehbiel 
1996: 556; Wilson and Young 1997: 28).
The other is the composition of co-sponsorship. When it is co-sponsored 
interests than attaining the goal of banning landmines. There was no minefield in 
his district. It was very hard to get him even understand landmine issues (from 
an interview with cho, Jai-Kook, 2009.9.18).
15 The average number of draft bills which a legislator initiated was 10.2 and that of drat 
bill which a legislator co-sponsored bills was 142.5 in the Korean National Assembly 
in 2008 (chung, W. and Kwon, H. 2009).
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by influential legislators in the majority party, committee chairs, or experts, a 
draft bill conveys its relevancy. Also, non-partisan co-sponsorship signals that 
the bill does not cater to partisan interests (Fenno 1991: 45-55; Koger 2003: 
228-29; Wilson and Young 1997: 29). Empirical studies of the co-sponsorship 
in the US congress attest to the signaling model (Koger 2003: 238-41; 
Krehbiel 1995: 910-12; Wilson and Young 1997: 34-37). 
It seems that the KcBL tended to focus on the size rather than the 
composition of co-sponsorship. The KcBL’s targeting was based on the 
following criteria: First, the KcBL lobbies assemblymen who had personal ties 
with the network’s key members. Assemblymen who were already acquainted 
with KcBL leaders joined as co-sponsors, even though they were not familiar 
with the anti-landmine campaign in detail. Meanwhile, it took long to meet 
and explain landmine issues to those who did not have personal ties with the 
anti-landmine movement. Second, the KcBL lobbied assemblymen who were 
involved in progressive social movements or democratic movements. 
“I was in charge of lobbying Assemblymen. When I was studying theology 
at Yonsei University in the late 1970s, I was involved in christian social 
movements. I was affiliated with the Ecumenical Youth council in Korea as a 
leader from the Methodist denomination and was later elected as the president 
of the council. At that time, the church was a safe heaven for the democratic 
movement. christian social movements and the democratic movement 
were intermingled. I got to know young leaders who participated in social 
movements in the second half of the 1970s. Those who led social movements 
and the democratic movement eventually became government officials (in the 
1990s and 2000s). I targeted assemblymen based on my personal connection” 
(from an interview with cho, Jae-Kook, 2009.9.19).
Several hypotheses derive from the KcBL’s lobbying experience and previous 
empirical studies on co-sponsorship.16
16 There are difficulties at testing the two competing models of co-sponsorship in the 
diffusion of the anti-landmine norm in the Korean National Assembly. As there are 
only two cases of co-sponsoring and no committee chair participated as a co-sponsor, 
it is impossible to assess the effect of the co-sponsorship composition upon the 
legislative process. Also, though the two bills are different in terms of their emphasis: 
one for landmine clearance, the other for humanitarian assistance to mine victims, it 
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Hypothesis 1. Those who are not affiliated with initiators’ political parties 
are more likely to be lobbied and participate in the co-sponsorship. 
Hypothesis 2. Members of the National Defense committee are more likely 
to be lobbied and participate in the co-sponsorship.
Hypothesis 3. Those who were involved in progressive social movements 
and the democratic movement are more likely to be lobbied and participate 
in the co-sponsorship.
2. Potential Co-Sponsors’ Interests
There are three factors in deciding whether to participate in the co-
sponsorship. one is the constituency interest. An assemblyman’s participation 
in the co-sponsorship may be viewed as a behavior to represent the 
constituency interests of his/her district (Arnold 1990; Bianco 1994; Mayhew 
1974: 63). In other words, participating in the co-sponsorship is a way to 
outwardly display dedication toward constituency interests (Regens 1989: 
502-12). However, if a legislator co-sponsors a bill that goes against his/
her district interests, the backlash from constituents weakens the chance of 
being re-elected. Therefore, it is likely that a legislator co-sponsors draft bills 
which are consistent with his/her district interests. Promotion of constituency 
interests is more important than participating in the co-sponsorship for 
promising draft bills (Mayhew 1974: 62 & 132).17 
Another is the ideological orientations of legislators. co-sponsoring 
reveals the socio-economic orientations of participants (campbell 1982: 
417). It is a signal friendly to actors who want to politicize certain issues. The 
findings that moderates tend to be late joiners to draft bills imply that co-
sponsoring is an action to convey political stances on certain issues (Kessler 
and Krehbiel 1996: 562). Furthermore, when faced with controversial draft 
bills, co-sponsoring is a preemptive move to avoid being pressured to choose 
is hard to control the effect of the difference between the two draft bills upon the co-
sponsoring process.
17 The constituency interest hypothesis does not explain the co-sponsorship for draft 
bills which are negative to district interests. considering that legislators are not 
familiar to all draft bills in detail, the constituency interest hypothesis has a weakness 
in explaining the co-sponsorship (campbell 1982: 416).
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a side (Koger 2003: 232-33).
The last is party affiliation. Party is an institutionalized human network. 
Loose networks and groups based on personal ties exist in the legislature 
(Shin, H. 2004; Jeong, W. and Ahn, Y. 2004; Porter et al. 2005) and further 
there are co-sponsoring networks cross the partisan line (Kim, L. 2009; Yoo 
S. 2009). Partisan identification has relatively lost its influence in predicting 
the voting behavior in the Korean National Assembly (Lee, H. 2005). Yet, 
partisan identification is the most important factor in the co-sponsorship. 
Whether a legislator is affiliated with the same political party the sponsor of a 
draft bill belongs to is still most powerful in predicting whether the potential 
co-sponsor to support the bill or not (chung, W. and Kwon, H. 2009; Fowler 
2006: 483-84; Krehbiel 1995: 910).
The above three factors in the co-sponsorship leads to the following three 
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4. Those who have minefields in their districts are more likely 
to co-sponsor the anti-landmine bills.
Hypothesis 5. Progressive assemblymen are more likely to co-sponsor the 
anti-landmine bills.
Hypothesis 6. Those who are affiliated with the same political party the 
leading sponsors of the anti-landmine bills belong to are more likely to co-
sponsor the anti-landmine bills.
IV. RESEARcH DESIGN, FINDINGS, AND DIScUSSIoNS
Though previous studies identify several factors in explaining the co-
sponsorship at the Korean National Assembly, none of them assesses the 
relative explanatory power of each factor. This section presents a research 
design to assess how much each factor explains the co-sponsoring behavior at 
the Korean National Assembly.  
1. Two Anti-Personnel Landmine Bills
The ottawa Treaty gives several duties to each member state. First, each 
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member state should not use anti-personnel landmines. More specifically, 
each member state should not use anti-personnel landmines in storage “under 
any condition,” should not produce or retain anti-personnel landmines, 
neither transfer anti-personnel landmines to anybody (ottawa Treaty, 
Article 1, para.1).18 Second, each member state should destroy all anti-
personnel landmines which it possesses or controls (ottawa Treaty, Article 
4).19 Furthermore, each member state should clear planted anti-personnel 
landmines under its jurisdiction or control within 10 years after the entry into 
force of the convention (ottawa Treaty, Article 5, para.1 and 2). Third, each 
member state should provide assistance for landmine victims (ottawa Treaty, 
Article 6).
Two draft bills which incorporated partially the duties of the ottawa 
Treaty were introduced in the Korean National Assembly. on September 
5, 2003, Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-o presented a draft bill entitled as “the 
Bill on the clearance of Anti-Personnel Landmines and the compensation 
to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Hyong-o KIM” (draft bill # 162627). 
The draft bill has several features. First, this draft bill defines anti-personnel 
landmines as “inhumane weapons that indiscriminately claim casualties.” This 
definition implies that landmines do not contribute to national security, but 
actually threaten human security. Second, this bill frames planting landmines 
as an act to destroy the land. Meanwhile, it describes clearing landmines as an 
act to “restore the land into a normal state.” Third, this draft bill emphasizes 
the need of governmental compensations for landmine victims who were 
unable to apply for indemnities, portraying the governmental compensation 
as a way to help landmine victims maintain “socially and economically stable 
life.”  
Assemblyman Park, chan Suk introduced the other draft bill entitled as 
“The Special Bill on Assistances to Landmine Victims – Assemblyman Park, 
chan Suk” (draft bill # 174946). The bill incorporates minimally the ottawa 
Treaty. The bill does not mention the inhumane nature of anti-personnel 
18 Transferring mines with the intent to educate those who are involved in mine 
clearances is exceptionally accepted (ottawa Treaty, Article 3).
19 There is a 4-year grace period for the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel 
landmines after the entry into force of the convention for each member (ottawa 
Treaty, Article 4).
 Pathways from International Society to National Legislature 273
landmines; it does not refer to banning the use of and destruction of 
stockpiled landmines or the clearance of planted anti-personnel landmines. 
Nonetheless, it proposes a special grace period for landmine “victims and 
their families” to apply for monetary compensations. In addition, it mentions 
the need of “minimum medical assistances” to landmine victims. Although 
the anti-landmine norm was gaining supports in Korea, landmine as an 
instrument of national security was too strong for Assemblyman Park’s bill to 
incorporate fully the ottawa Treaty. 
2. Research Design
This article assesses the explanatory power of several factors in the co-
sponsorship for the anti-landmine bills in the Korean National Assembly. The 
dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of whether to participate in the 
legislative process for the anti-landmine norm as a co-sponsor. Independent 
variables include partisan identification, the membership to the National 
Defense committee, involvement in progressive movements, ideological 
orientations, and the presence of minefield in a district. This article employs a 
series of cross-tabulation analyses and a logit analysis. 
Dependent Variable. It is a dummy of whether a assemblyman to co-
sponsor the two anti-landmine bills in the Korean National Assembly: 
Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-o’s bill on September 5, 2003 and Assemblyman 
Park, chan Suk’s bill on September 18, 2006.” 30 people co-sponsored 
Assemblyman Kim’s;20 46 people co-sponsored Assemblyman Park’s 
bill.21 Participants are coded “1” and others “0.”
20 The co-sponsors were Kwon, Ki-Sool, Kwon, oh-Eul, Kim, Seong Ho, Kim, Young 
Whan, Kim, Yong Hak, Kim, Won Wung, Kim, Hee Sun, Namgoong, Seuk, Min, 
Bong-Gee, Park, Myung-hwan, Park, chong-Ung, Park, Jin, Shim, Jae-chul, Ahn, 
Sang Soo, Yang, Jung-Kyu, Eom, Ho Sung, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, Keun Jin, Lee, Sung-
Hun, Lee, Won Young, Lee, Yoon Sung, Lee, Jae-oh, Lee, Joo-Young, Lee, chang Bok, 
chang, Sung-Won, chung, Kab-Yoon, choung, Byoung-Gug, and Hong, Moon-Jong.
21 The co-sponsors were Kang, Gi-Jung, Kang, chang Il, Koak, Sung Moon, Kim, Duk 
Kyu, Kim, Sung-Gon, Kim, Jae Yun, Kim, Jae-Hong, Kim, Jong Yull, Kim, Tae Nyeon, 
Kim, Hyuk Kyu, Kim, Hyung-o, Kim, Hee Sun, Noh, Woong Rae, Park, Myung 
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Independent Variables. Five independent variables and one control variable 
are incorporated. The first independent variable is a dummy variable of 
whether a legislator is affiliated with the same party where a leading sponsor 
is associated. Those who share a partisan identification with a leading sponsor 
are coded “1” and others “0.” The second is a dummy variable of whether a 
legislator is a member of the National Defense committee. The members of 
the National Defense committee are coded “1” and others “0.” The third is 
a dummy variable of whether a legislator was involved in progressive social 
movements. Those who were involved in progressive social movements are 
coded “1” and others “0.” 22 The fourth is a dummy variable of whether a 
Kwang, Park, Sei-hwan, Bahk, Jaewan, Song, Young-Sun, Shin, Kinam, Shin, Sang 
Jin, Sim, Jae Duck, Ahn, Myoung ock, Ahn, Byong-Yub, Ahn, Sang Soo, Ahn, Young 
Keun, Eom, Ho Sung, Woo, Sang Ho, Woo, Won Shik, Lew, Seon Ho, You, Seung-
Hee, Yoo, Jay Kun, Lee, Kyung Sook, Lee, Kwang-Jae, Lee, Kwang chol, Lee, Keun-Sik, 
Rhee, Mok Hee, Lee, Si Jong, Lee, In Ki, Lee, In Young, Lee, Jae oh, Im, Jong In, Jung, 
chung Rae, cho, Seong Rae, cho, Il Hyun, choe, Kyoo Sik, choi, Jae chun, and Han, 
Kwang Won.
22 We referenced Donga Ilbo’s Who Are in the 16th National Assembly? and Who Are in the 
17 National Assembly? to code whether a given legislator was involved in progressive 
social movments (Donga Ilbo’s Editorial Deparment 2000; Donga Ilbo’s Editorial 
Deparment 2004). Also, we look at several other articles to code the involment in 
progressive social movements (Park, c. 2004; Baik, W. and Shin, c. 2004; cho, S. 
2003; choi, J. 2004; Hue, M. 2003). We identified 44 assemblymen who had been 
involved in progressive social movements and were in active service in 2003: Kang, 
Samjae, Kim, Kyungjae, Kim, Geun Tae, Kim, Deog Ryong, Kim, Moon Soo, Kim, 
Boo-Kyum, Kim, Sung-Ho, Kim, Young-choon, Kim, Won Ki, Kim, Won Wung, Kim, 
Tae Hong, Kim, Hong Shin, Kim, Hee Sun, Park, Kwan-Yong, Suh, Sang-Sup, Sul, 
Hoon, Song, Young Gil, Shin, Geh-Ryeun, Shim, Kew cheol, Shim, Jae-Kwon, Shim, 
Jae-chul, Ahn, Young Keun, oh, Se-Hoon, oh, Young-Sik, Won, Hee-Ryong, Rhyu, 
Simin, Lee, Mykyung, Lee, Bu-young, Lee, Sang Su, Lee, Sung Hun, Lee, Woo-Jae, 
Lee, Jae oh, Lee, Jong Kul, Lee, chang Bok, Lee, Hae chan, Lee, Ho Wung, Im, Jong 
Seok, Lim, chae Jung, chang, Kwang Keun, chang, Young Dal, chung, Dong-Young, 
choung, Byoung-gug, and Hong, Sa-Duk. Also, we identified 56 assemblymen who 
had been involved in progressive social movements and were in active in 2006: Kang, 
Ki Kab, Kang, Gi-Jung, Kang, chang Il, Go, Jin Hwa, Kwon, Young Ghil, Kim, Geun 
Tae, Kim, Deog Ryong, Kim, Boo-Kyum, Kim, Young-chun, Kim, Won Ki, Kim, Won 
Wung, Kim, Tae Nyeon, Kim, Tae Hong, Kim, Hyun Mee, Kim, Hee Sun, Noh, Young 
Min, Roh, Hoe-chan, Dan, Byung Ho, Moon, Hee Sang, Min, Byung Doo, Park, Kye 
Dong, Baek, Won Woo, Sun, Byung Ryul, Song, Young Gil, Shim, Sang Jeong, Shim, 
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legislator has minefields in his/her district. Those who have minefields in 
their districts are coded “1” and others “0.” 23 The fifth is a composite index 
of ideological orientations which Joongang Ilbo and the Korean Association 
of Party Studies made based on the survey data entitled “Ideology and Policy 
orientations of Elected Assemblymen” in 2002 and 2004. The composite 
index ranges from “0” (very progressive) to “10” (very conservative). Lastly, 
the gender is incorporated as a control variable. It is coded “1” for female 
assemblymen and “0” for males.24 
3. Cross-Tabulation Analyses
We carried out a series of cross-tabulation analyses to find out whether the 
six independent variables explain the co-sponsoring behavior in the Korean 
National Assembly. First, Table 1 presents the cross-tabulation analysis 
Jae-chul, Ahn, Young-Keun, Woo, Sang Ho, Woo, Won-Shik, Won, Hye Young, Won, 
Hee-Ryong, Yoo, Ki Hong, You, Seung-Hee, Rhyu, Simin, Yoo, Ihn-Tae, Lee, Kwang-
Jae, Lee, Ki Woo, Lee, Mykyung, Lee, Young Soon, Lee, In Young, Lee, Jae oh, Lee, 
Jong Kul, Lee, Hae chan, Lee, Hwa-Young, Im, Jong Seok, Lim, chae Jung, chang, 
Young Dal, choung, Byoung-gug, chung, Bon Ju, Jung, chung Rae, chun, Youngse, 
choi, Soon Young, choi, Jae Sung, Han, Myeong-Sook, Han, Byung Do, and Hyun, 
Ae Ja. 
23 We referenced the two reports published by the KcBL to identify assemblymen whose 
districts had minefields when the two anti-landmine bills were introduced (The KcBL 
2001; The KcBL 2006). We identified 33 assemblymen whose districts had minefields 
in 2003: Kang, Bong Kyun, Kang, Sung-Goo, Kim, Deog Ryong, Kim, Young-il, Kim, 
Yong Hak, Kim, Yong Hwan, Kim, Hyung-o, Na, oh-Yeon, Moon, Seok Ho, Park, 
Geun Hye, Park, Jong-Woo, Park, Joo Sun, Bae, Ki Yoon, Suh, Sang-Sup, Song, Hoon 
Suk, Ahn, Young Keun, Yoon, Doo-Hwan, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Rhee, Q-Taek, Lee, Sang 
Deuk, Lee, Yong-Sam, Lee, Jai chang, Lee, Han Dong, Lee, Hae Goo, chang, Sun 
Won, choung, Byoung-gug, chung, Woo-taik, chung, Jang Sun, choo, chin-Woo, 
choi, Don-Woong, choi, Byung Gook, Han, Seung-Soo, Ham, Suk Jae, and Hwang, 
Woo-Yea. Also, we identified 16 assemblymen who had minefields in their districts in 
2006: Ko, Jeou Heung, Kim, Yang Soo, Ryu, Keun chan, Park, Sei-hwan, Shim, Jae-
Yup, Ahn, Byong Yup, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, Kwang-Jae, Rhee, Q-Taek, Lee, Jai chang, 
chung, Moon-Hun, choung, Byoung-gug, chung, Jang Sun, choi, chul Kook, Han, 
Kwang Won, and Hwang, Woo-Yea.
24 Women have been reported to be more inclined to participate in humanitarian aid 
than men (Sapiro 2003).
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between partisan identification and co-sponsorship. It shows that when 
s/he was affiliated with the same political party where a leading sponsor 
was associated, a given legislator was more active in the co-sponsorship. 
Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-o’s draft bill was more co-sponsored by his 
colleagues in the Grand National Party; Assemblyman chan-Suk’s was more 
supported by his colleagues in the Uri Party. 
The comparison between the two cases clearly shows that partisan 
identification is associated with the co-sponsoring behavior. only 4 legislators 
co-sponsored Assemblyman Park’s bill out of 13 assemblymen who had 
already been involved in introducing Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-o’s bill in 
2003 and were in active service in 2006: Kim, Hyung-o (the leading sponsor), 
Kim, Hee Sun (co-sponsor), Ahn, Sang Soo (co-sponsor), and Lee, Jae oh 
(co-sponsor). Meanwhile, 9 legislators who had supported Assemblyman 
Kim’s and were in active service in 2006 did not support Assemblyman Park’s: 
Kwon, oh-Eul, Kim, Won Wung, Park, Jin, Shim, Jae-chul, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, 
Lee, Yoon Sung, Lee, Joo-Young, chang, Sung-Won, chung, Kab-Yoon, and 
choung, Byoung-Gug. Eight legislators who had supported Assemblyman 
Kim’s in 2003 and did not support Assemblyman Park’s in 2006 were affiliated 
with the Grand National Party. The finding implies that the 8 legislators co-
sponsored Assemblyman Kim’s, simply because they were members of the 
Grand National Party, considering that Assemblyman Kim’s bill incorporated 
more elements of the ottawa Treaty than Assemblyman Park’s. 
Second, Table 2 present the cross-tabulation analysis between committee 
membership and co-sponsorship. It appears that the members of National 
Defense committee participated in the co-sponsorship less than others. 
The percentage of the committee members who co-sponsored the two anti-
landmine bills is 17.14%, while that of the non-committee members who 
supported the two bills is 13.16%. However, there is no statistically significant 
difference between the two groups. 
The detailed comparison between the two cases unveils that the 
membership to the National Defense committee was not related with the co-
sponsorship. Assemblyman Park, Sei-hwan and chung, Dae-chul, who were 
members of the National Defense committee and studies landmine issues 
with Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-o in 2001, did not co-sponsor Kim’s draft 
bill in 2003. only Assemlyman Lee, Kyeong-Jae supported Kim’s bill out of 12 
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members of the National Defense committee in 2003: Kang, Samjae, Kang, 
chang-Sung, Kang, chang-hee, Kim, Ki-Jai, Kim, Jong-Pil, Park, Sei-hwan, 
Park, Yang-Soo, Suh, chung-Won, Yoo, Han Yul, Lee, Kyeong-Jae, Lee, Man-
Sup, and Lee, Sang Deuk. only 5 members (Kim, Sung-Gon, Song, Young-
Sun, Ahn, Young Keun, Yoo, Jay Kun, and Lee, Keun-Sik) co-sponsored 
Assemblyman Park’s bill in 2006 out of 17 members of the National Defense 
committee. 
It seems that partisan identification is more powerful than committee 
membership in the co-sponsorship. Assemblyman Lee, Kyeong-Jae, the only 
co-sponsor of Assemblyman Kim’s bill in 2003 out of 13 members of the 
National Defense committee, was affiliated with the Grand National Party 
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where Assemblyman Kim was a member; four assemblymen who supported 
Assemblyman Park’s bill in 2006 and were members of the National Defense 
committee were members to the Yuri Party where Assemblyman Park was 
associated. This finding implies that the effect of partisan identification is 
dominant over that of  committee membership.
Third, Table 3 presents the cross-tabulation analysis between the 
involvement in progressive social movements and co-sponsorship. It shows 
that the percentage of those who had been involved in progressive social 
movements and co-sponsored the anti-landmine bills is 22%, while that of 
those who had not been involved in any progressive social movement but 
co-sponsored the bills is 11.56%. The difference between the two groups is 
statistically significant.
Fourth, Table 4 presents the cross-tabulation analysis between 
constituency interest and co-sponsorship. It appears that those whose 
districts had minefields were more active in the co-sponsorship than those 
whose districts were free from landmines. The percentage of those who had 
minefields in their districts and supported the two anti-landmine bills is 
16.33%, while that of those who were free from landmines and supported the 
two bills is 13.13%. However, the difference between the two groups is not 
statistically significant. It implies that constituency interests were not strong 
in the co-sponsorship. 
Fifth, Table 5 presents the cross-tabulation analysis between gender 
Table 3. cross-Tabulation Analysis between Involvement in Progressive Social 
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and co-Sponsorship. It appears that female assemblymen were less active 
in co-sponsoring the two anti-landmine bills than male counterparts. The 
percentage of female assemblymen who were involved in the co-sponsorship 
for the anti-landmine norm is 10.71%, while that of male assemblymen who 
supported the two bills is 13.73%. This finding is not consistent with reports 
that women are more active in peace movements. considering that female 
assemblymen were over-represented at the National Defense committee, this 
finding appears to be counter-intuitive to the conventional wisdom. 
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4. Logit Analysis
A logit analysis is employed to assess the relative explanatory power of 
the six factors at the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm in the 
Korean National Assembly. There are two notable finding in the table 6. 
First, partisan identification and ideological orientations have statistically 
significant coefficients. This finding is consistent with the cross-tabulation 
analyses. This finding implies that the log-rolling is linked with partisan 
identification, if there is. Also, this finding implies that co-sponsorship reflect 
personal beliefs on social issues. The fact progressive legislators were more 
active in the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm is associated the 
linkage between anti-landmine norm and human security. 
Second, committee membership, involvement in progressive social 
movements, gender and constituency interest do not have any statistically 
significant coefficient. This finding is consistent with the most of the cross-
tabulation analyses in the previous section except for the case of involvement 
in progressive social movements. This finding that the involvement in 
progressive movements is not associated with the co-sponsorship implies that 
there is a strong ideological bifurcation among those who had participated 
in social movements (choi, S. 2009). considering that the composite index 
of ideological orientations is weakly associated with the involvement in 
progressive social movement (Pearson’s correlation coefficient = -0.3506, 
p-value = 0.000), some of those who were involved in progressive social 
movement become conservative.
The far right column of Table 6 presents a series of relative risks which the 
method of recycled predictions generates.25 There are two notable findings in 
25 The method of recycled predictions is helpful in assessing the substantive significance 
of independent variables in explaining the variance in dependent variable, partially 
overcoming the weakness of statistical significance tests. Three steps are taken 
to generate the right three columns in Table 6 for each independent variable. 
First, after finishing maximum likelihood analyses on the relationship between 
independent variables and a limited (categorical) dependent variable, the minimum 
value for a given independent variable is incorporated to replace all real values for 
the independent variable and the average predicted probability (“minimum” in 
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the relative risk analysis. First, the composite index of ideological orientations 
is the crucial factor in the co-sponsorship for the anti-landmine norm. The 
probability of an extremely conservative assembly member participating in 
co-sponsorship is a meager 0.04405 in the 16th and 17th National Assemblies, 
while an extremely progressive assembly member’s probability jumps to 
0.25940 (relative risk = 488.8%). The probability of the latter is approximately 
five times greater than that of the former.
Second, partisan identification is the second most influential factor in 
the co-sponsorship for the two anti-landmine bills. When a legislator is 
not affiliated with the same party where a leading sponsor is associated, the 
average predicted probability of co-sponsoring is 0.05815. In contrast, when 
a legislator and a leading sponsor are members to a same political party, 
the average predicted probability of co-sponsoring is 0.16799 (relative risk 
Table 6) is calculated. It is the reference probability. Second, the maximum value 
for the same independent variable is incorporated to replace all real values for the 
independent variable and the average predicted probability (“maximum” in Table 6) 
is calculated. Third, the relative risk is calculated. The relative risk’s formula is [(the 
average predicted probability of “maximum” – that of “minimum)/that of “minimun”] 
(STATAcorp 2002).
Table 6. Logit Analysis of co-Sponsorship
Dependent Variable = 
co-sponsorship coeff. S.E. p-value
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= 188.9%). The probability of the latter is almost twice as high as that of 
the former. considering that the logit analysis controls the effect of the rest 
independent variables, this finding vindicates that political parties are strong 
networks in the co-sponsorship. 
V. coNcLUSIoN
The Korean National Assembly is a locus where the anti-landmine norm is 
being empowered. Some legislators play key roles in introducing alternative 
frames to the conventional perspective to anti-personnel landmine as an 
instrument of national defense and domesticating the anti-landmine norm 
into the domestic legal system. They have been collaborating with the Korea 
campaign to Ban Landmines, the Korean chapter of International campaign 
to Ban Landmines. They have been trying to legitimize policies consistent 
with the global anti-landmine norm. It is an act of norm empowerment.
This study analyzes two aspects of empowering the anti-landmine norm: 
introduction and legal sponsorship. This study provides several implications 
to the understanding of the Korean politics. First, ideological orientations are 
more important than partisan identification in explaining the co-sponsorship 
for controversial issues in the 16th and 17th National Assemblies.26 Landmine 
victims have not formed into a well-organized actor in empowering the 
anti-landmine norm in Korean politics, even though their welfare is 
directly related with it. Progressive NGos, humanitarian assistance groups, 
progressive politicians have been active in importing the anti-landmine 
norm. The ideological fault-line is critical in the co-sponsorship for the 
26 Table 6 shows that the impact of ideological orientations upon the average predicted 
probability of co-sponsoring is stronger than that of partisan identification by almost 
3 times. This finding may reflect the partisan realignment from 2003 and 2007. 
The Millennium Democratic Party, the ruling party from 2000 to 2003, was under 
disintegration, when Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-o sponsored the first anti-landmine 
bill in 2003; The Uri Party, the ruling party from 2003 to 2007, was plagued by the “lame 
duck” phenomenon, when Assemblyman Park, chan-Suk introduced the second anti-
landmine bill in 2006. It is natural that partisan identification was not influential, 
when parties were realigned.
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anti-landmine norm. It is consistent with previous empirical studies on the 
voting behavior in the Korean National Assembly (Lee, H. 2005; chung, W. 
and Hong, S. 2009). Second, this study implies that there may be a strong 
ideological bifurcation among assemblymen who had been involved in 
progressive social movement. Former activists in progressive movements 
were recruited into conservative parties as well as progressive ones. Some 
active assemblymen who had been involved in progressive movements 
may have become conservative. Their current ideological orientations have 
stronger than their previous activities in explaining the co-sponsorship.
This study has a couple of limitations for generalization. First, the anti-
landmine norm is ideologically biased. considering that the anti-landmine 
norm has been associated with politically progressive coalitions, it is natural 
that the ideological fault-line is more influential than partisan identification. 
Second, the number of cases is too small to identify an evolution in terms of 
NGo tactics. The KcBL targeted assemblymen whose districts had landmine 
fields in 2006, while it heavily lobbies assemblymen based on personal 
connections in 2003. Though the difference between the time points almost 
reaches the statistical significance level, it is hard to verify whether the KcBL’s 
targeting change paid off.
This study has a couple of further research topics. First, it does not explain 
why female assemblymen were less inactive in co-sponsoring the anti-
landmine bills. Though it is suspected that female assemblymen were not 
targeted by the KcBL or were isolated from military issues in general, this 
study does not provide a reliable answer yet. Second, the composition of co-
sponsorship might affect the co-sponsorship size. Assemblyman Kim, Hyung-
o’s bill, which was co-sponsored by a committee member to the National 
Defense committee, attracted 28 additional supporters; Assemblyman Park, 
chan-Suk’s bill, which was co-sponsored by 5 committee members to the 
same committee, got 40 additional supporters. Though the composition of 
co-sponsorship appears to affect the size, the number of cases is too small.
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